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What Is Left of Pelech? 
Robert Leckey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In core areas of private law, lawyers and judges routinely cite cases 
centuries old. The great English judges of the 18th and 19th centuries 
still speak through their judgments on property, contracts and torts, 
while the most eminent Quebec judges of the 19th century retain 
relevance for the civil law of property and obligations. By contrast, in 
family law it is rare to cite a case 40 or even 30 years old. A Denning 
family judgment from 1950 appears almost ancient. Legislatures have 
rightly relegated to the history books rules and doctrines repugnant to 
present observers, such as the doctrine of coverture and the hierarchy of 
illegitimate filiations. The sense seems to be that the repeal of the rules 
they elaborated has rendered those old judgments, and commentary on 
them, irrelevant. One need not mourn the demise of these ghastly 
instances of family regulation to wonder if the forward-looking briskness 
of scholars has perhaps deprived family law of the historically minded 
reflection — so evident in other areas — on how the meaning and 
significance of judicial and scholarly texts change over time. Instead of 
rereading old judgments and doctrine in light of subsequent decisions, 
research and events, family law scholars often enough just ignore them. 
If the enterprise of this volume consists in rereading Justice Bertha 
Wilson from a temporal distance, three judgments of hers, known 
collectively as the Pelech trilogy,1 are especially well-suited to serve as 
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1 Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] S.C.J. No. 31, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Pelech”]; Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] S.C.J. No. 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Richardson”]; Caron v. Caron, [1987] S.C.J. No. 32, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.). 
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point of departure for inquiry into the life of family law judgments and 
scholarship over time. These judgments are suitable in part because they 
turned on the extent to which texts — in those cases separation 
agreements concluded by estranged spouses — retain force to govern the 
future or succumb to the hazards of later events. This paper’s concern is 
not the durability of an agreement between particular former spouses, 
but that of Justice Wilson’s reasons and the sophisticated critical 
reaction they provoked, much of it avowedly feminist. It adopts a socio-
legal focus on texts in evolutionary motion, rejecting a dogmatic focus 
on law as an object frozen “dans l’instant de la positivité”.2 Put 
otherwise, the hermeneutic inquiry is not what Justice Wilson intended 
to say in 1987, but what the judgments and their scholarly reception say 
now. 
The Pelech trilogy called the Supreme Court of Canada to 
pronounce on important matters in family law at a time of significant 
change. Though the judicial developments under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms3 of the 1990s and the present decade often 
monopolize scholars’ attention, the late 1980s marked the end of a wave 
of legislative reform to family law.4 In 1968 the Parliament of Canada’s 
first exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction to legislate in respect of divorce 
resulted in the Divorce Act.5 Remote as it seems today, the 1968 Act had 
replaced a patchwork of regimes that included received colonial law and 
the declaration in the Civil Code of Lower Canada of 1866 that marriage 
was dissolved only by death. Less than two decades later, Parliament 
superseded that statute with fresh divorce legislation.6 In the 1970s, 
legislatures, galvanized by the public outcry occasioned by the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Murdoch v. Murdoch,7 set about reforming 
matrimonial property regimes. In the last years of that decade and into 
the 1980s, provincial legislatures overhauled the law connecting children 
to their parents by abolishing distinctions between legitimate and 
                                                                                                             
2 Jean Carbonnier, Sociologie juridique, 2d ed. (Paris: Quadrige, 2004), at 350. 
3 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
4 Robert Leckey, “Family Law as Fundamental Private Law” (2007) 86 Can. Bar Rev. 69, 
at 86-87. 
5 R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8 [hereinafter “1968 Act”]. 
6 R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3 [hereinafter “1986 Act”]. 
7 [1973] S.C.J. No. 150, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Murdoch”]. In that 
judgment, the majority of the Supreme Court — all but Laskin J. — rejected a wife’s claim for a 
share in assets to which her husband held title and towards which the two had worked through 
decades of marriage. 
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illegitimate children. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court had, on several 
occasions, interpreted the general law of obligations and property in 
favour of a woman disadvantaged by her male partner’s holding 
exclusive title to assets acquired and improved during their conjugal 
relationship.8 The discourse animating these reforms, and pervasive in 
social and legal discourse, was one of formal equality: “sameness of 
treatment was all that was required to meet the principle of equality”.9 
The disputes in the Pelech trilogy made their way to the Supreme Court 
at this moment in which a commitment to formal equality prevailed. 
The Pelech trilogy concerned three sets of divorced spouses. Each 
former wife sought an order for spousal support under the 1968 Act.10 
The difficulty was that those applications were inconsistent with the 
parties’ prior agreements limiting such support.11 The disputes put in 
issue not only the extent to which spousal support duties survived a 
marriage’s dissolution by divorce, but also the measure in which a court 
would recognize a support obligation exceeding that delimited by the 
parties in a prior consensual agreement.12 The principle that a 
maintenance agreement can never totally extinguish the jurisdiction of 
the court to impose its own terms on the parties — concretized in the 
statute — provided the basis for the women’s claims. This principle and 
the subject-matter distinguished the cases from ordinary contract 
scenarios where the parties have mutually rescinded their contract or 
otherwise extinguished their obligations.  
                                                                                                             
8 See, e.g., Rathwell v. Rathwell, [1978] S.C.J. No. 14, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436 (S.C.C.); 
Beaudoin-Daigneault v. Richard, [1984] S.C.J. No. 2, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). 
9 Alison Harvison Young, “The Changing Family, Rights Discourse and the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 749, at 760 [hereinafter “‘The Changing Family’”]. 
10 Supra, note 5. 
11 All three applicants — Shirley Mae Pelech, Donna Gail Richardson and Betty Anne 
Caron — were receiving social assistance. Mrs. Pelech had applied for further spousal support 13 
years after the divorce; the maintenance agreement concluded with the husband had provided 
spousal support for 13 months. The Richardsons had concluded a separation agreement providing 
Mrs. Richardson with spousal support for one year; that entitlement had expired by the time of the 
divorce proceedings, and it was in the divorce action itself that she sought further support. The 
Carons’ situation was different: their separation agreement provided for spousal support payable to 
the wife until she remarried or cohabited in a conjugal relationship for more than three months. Mrs. 
Caron had cohabited with someone longer than the stated period and Mr. Caron consequently 
discontinued payments, though the new partner failed to support Mrs. Caron. 
12 Mere mention of a “consensual agreement” here likely disturbs some readers: it is fair to 
wonder how thoroughly informed were the women, or whether they expected that a later court 
would regard the agreement as so conclusive, or whether their factual assumptions about their 
ability to achieve economic self-sufficiency were reasonable. 
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While sitting on the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Justice Wilson had 
proven herself a pioneer for women’s entitlements in her development of 
the common law of trusts in connection with a proprietary claim 
advanced by a woman after a long-term unmarried cohabitation.13 At 
first blush, the Pelech trilogy, which few hailed as an advance for 
women, appears to depart from Justice Wilson’s earlier path. The 
disjuncture appears lesser if one contrasts her expansive approach to the 
law of property in the earlier judgment, where a long-term relationship 
fell outside any regime of protective default rules, from the 
circumstances in Pelech where parties, having the benefit of the scheme 
of the 1968 Act,14 had agreed on quantum and duration for the rights it 
envisaged. 
In all three cases of the Pelech trilogy, the majority of the Court 
denied the applications for spousal maintenance. Justice Wilson held that 
a court should order spousal maintenance contrary to the parties’ 
settlement of their affairs only where a “radical change in circumstances 
flow[ed] from an economic pattern of dependency engendered by the 
marriage”.15 All three applicants failed to satisfy the threshold for 
variation of a prior agreement. If they required help to survive, former 
spouses who had signed away their right to spousal support should look 
to the state’s income support regime, not to their former husbands. 
Individuals should be held responsible for their decisions, held Justice 
Wilson, and decisions in winding down the marital enterprise formed no 
exception. 
The judges of the Court had no pretence that their decisions in the 
trilogy were syllogistic applications of established major premises, in the 
form of posited rules, to minor premises, in the form of facts. Rather, the 
judgments, especially Pelech, show an explicit working through of 
different plausible approaches for adjudicating such claims. Justice 
Wilson was aware of a tension between “competing values of fairness 
and freedom”.16 She contrasted the need to compensate for systemic 
gender-based inequality — hardly an orthodox consideration in the 
delineation of private law rights and duties — with the interest in the 
finality of arrangements on divorce. 
                                                                                                             
13 Becker v. Pettkus, [1978] O.J. No. 3398, 20 O.R. (2d) 105 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1980] S.C.J. 
No. 103, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834 (S.C.C.). Justice Wilson relied on the dissent by Laskin J. in Murdoch, 
supra, note 7. 
14 Supra, note 5. 
15 Pelech, supra, note 1, at 851. 
16 Id., at 849. 
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The trilogy bequeathed difficult practical questions to judges and 
scholars concerning its scope and application. Judicial developments 
have largely resolved or superseded these difficulties. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has overruled the trilogy’s test, while 
reserving the policy concerns driving the trilogy as “not ... wholly 
irrelevant”.17 This paper does not defend the trilogy’s outcomes in the 
three appeals, nor does it aim to blunt the criticism that the judgments 
underestimated the impediments for former wives on the path to self-
sufficiency. Instead, it attends to the theoretical criticisms of the 
judgments’ alignment of families, the state and the market. 
The title of this paper suggests a two-fold inquiry. First, what 
remains of the trilogy, now that it has been overruled? Might Justice 
Wilson’s judgments and their reception by scholars nonetheless 
contribute to present debates? Second, do the attacks levied against those 
judgments from the left still hold? Which commitments in family law 
stand to the left of Pelech? Exploration of these questions unfolds in 
three parts. Part II attempts to dislocate Pelech from its usual place in the 
current narrative of spousal support, indicating (modest) ways in which 
it might have laid the groundwork for the watershed judgment of Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé in Moge v. Moge.18 Part III canvasses the criticisms 
produced shortly after the judgment that Pelech privatized the family. 
Those criticisms obscure the trilogy’s important public dimensions. The 
transformation of the welfare state of the 1980s and 1990s changes the 
significance that the trilogy and the scholarly criticisms have today. Part 
IV tests criticisms of Justice Wilson’s individualism in family matters in 
light of more recent debates and disputes in family law. If her emphasis 
on the enforcement of private agreements resulted in material 
disadvantage for women who had followed traditional marital patterns, 
that emphasis seems to hold some promise for those seeking to inhabit 
less traditional configurations of family. 
II. REFIGURING THE RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE 
Today the literature on the modern law of maintenance in Canada 
reveals a standard story. As related by Carol Rogerson, the leading 
Canadian scholar on spousal support, it is built around “a series of three 
                                                                                                             
17 Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] S.C.J. No. 21, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, at para. 40 (S.C.C.). 
18 [1992] S.C.J. No. 107, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moge”]. 
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important decisions”.19 First came Pelech, which enjoined judges to 
enforce almost all final agreements. On what became an influential 
reading, it also set out a general theory of spousal support promoting the 
“clean break”,20 an approach applicable whether or not the parties had 
concluded an agreement limiting support. Many scholars regarded the 
judgment as bad, abstract, atomistic and inattentive to structural gender 
disadvantage: a defeat for women. Next came Moge. Informed by social 
science on the prevalence of women’s poverty after divorce, and 
influenced by the value of substantive equality radiating from the 
Charter, it developed spousal support’s compensatory mission. It 
emphasized the imperative of an equitable sharing of the consequences 
of a marriage or of its breakdown. In other words, spousal support 
served, not only prospectively to tide a wife over until she achieved self-
sufficiency, but also, retrospectively, to compensate her for the losses 
flowing from the marriage. Moge was contextual and alert to women’s 
material disadvantage on divorce: a victory for women.21 Bracklow v. 
Bracklow,22 the next in the story, is confusing enough to resist 
characterization. Whatever else it decided, though, it announced the 
possibility of spousal support that is non-compensatory. That is, 
Bracklow contemplated support even where the claimant could not 
demonstrate loss connected to the marriage. The support creditors for 
whom this development is good news — ill or disabled, with a former 
spouse able to pay — are often women. 
In this story, Pelech inaugurates the judicial elaboration of modern 
spousal support. It becomes the foil of Moge, its “background”.23 The 
virtues of the victory in Moge become discernible by contrast with the 
evils of the defeat in Pelech. The tendency to characterize family law 
judgments as victories or defeats for women reflects the feminist 
understanding of family law as a site of gender struggle. Such a 
theoretical lens undoubtedly illuminates crucial features of family law. It 
can, however, conceal factors that complicate positive and negative 
                                                                                                             
19 Carol Rogerson, “The Canadian Law of Spousal Support” (2004) 38 Fam. L.Q. 69, at 73. 
20 The source generally acknowledged for this view is James G. McLeod, “Case Comment 
on Pelech v. Pelech” (1987) 7 R.F.L. (3d) 225. 
21 One reading qualifies the victories of Moge as “uncomfortable”, though victories 
nonetheless: Colleen Sheppard, “Uncomfortable Victories and Unanswered Questions: Lessons 
from Moge” (1995) 12 Can. J. Fam. L. 283. 
22 [1999] S.C.J. No. 14, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bracklow”]. 
23 Nicholas Bala, “Spousal Support Transformed — Fairer Treatment for Women” (1994) 
11 C.F.L.Q. 13, at 15. 
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characterizations of judgments.24 This standard account of the 
development of spousal support under federal divorce legislation can 
impede full appreciation of Pelech in two respects. One, to which Part 
III will turn, concerns the judgment’s foregrounding of the state’s 
support obligations in a way consistent with some progressive and 
feminist commitments. The other concerns the extent to which Pelech 
may be fruitfully read as replying to its antecedents. Released from its 
conscription as background to Moge, Pelech reveals important judicial 
efforts to recognize spousal support as an economic right. 
While Moge interpreted the support provisions in the 1986 Act,25 
Pelech applied its 1968 predecessor. If statutory interpretation always 
requires of judges a role that is “inescapably creative”,26 the earlier 
legislation on maintenance was especially open-textured. The court 
might order maintenance if it thought it “fit and just to do so having 
regard to the conduct of the parties and the condition, means and other 
circumstances of each of them”.27 The provision in the 1968 Act 
indicated neither the aims in awarding an alimentary pension nor the 
pertinent criteria. Readers of Pelech suggest that Justice Wilson viewed 
spousal support with suspicion, or downright negativity. In one of the 
stronger formulations, Pelech is said to regard maintenance as “a 
necessary evil, to be frowned upon and terminated as quickly as 
possible”.28 Scholars risk, though, overstating Justice Wilson’s antipathy 
towards support and, consequently, underestimating her discussion’s 
progressive thrust. The trilogy’s treatment of spousal support may be 
viewed, not as a cramped, inadequate precursor of the more generous 
compensatory understanding that flowered in Moge, but as an attempt to 
bury the past. 
Not so long before the litigation — certainly throughout most of 
John and Shirley Pelech’s marriage — maintenance had played a role 
different than anything now contemplated. Prior to the 1968 Act, spousal 
maintenance was a pension payable to “a faultless wife to maintain her 
                                                                                                             
24 See exploration of this idea in Robert Leckey, “Contracting Claims and Family Law 
Feuds” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 1. Interrogation of the standard account here is inspired by scrutiny of the 
standard periodization of “Western feminist storytelling”. Clare Hemmings, “Telling Feminist 
Stories” (2005) 6 Feminist Theory 115, at 117. 
25 Supra, note 6. 
26 T.R.S. Allan, “Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, Meaning, 
and Authority” (2004) 63 Cambridge L.J. 686, at 708. 
27 1968 Act, supra, note 5, s. 11(1). 
28 Steve Wexler, “Case Comment on Ritchie v. Ritchie” (1989) 18 R.F.L. (3d) 443, at 445. 
110 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
in the standard to which her errant husband had accustomed her”.29 
Conversely, a wife who committed adultery lost any claim to 
maintenance, showing the regime’s disciplinary character regarding 
women’s sexuality.30 The former understanding of maintenance was 
consistent with historical representations of women as “thought, 
represented, defined from the point of view of the Man”, defined in the 
“economy of masculine desire”.31 
Justice Wilson’s judgment aimed to shift maintenance from the moral 
to the economic realm. She announced herself to be carrying out a “change 
in emphasis” regarding alimony, one having occurred since the enactment 
of the 1968 Act. This move, which she characterized as “salutary”, was one 
away from “moral blameworthiness or ‘fault’”.32 When speaking of the 
economic dependency appropriately addressed by spousal support 
inconsistent with a final agreement, she spoke of need arising, not from the 
conduct of either spouse, but from the marriage. Spousal maintenance was 
henceforth “the right of the spouse and a spouse can therefore contract as to 
the amount of maintenance he or she is to receive”.33 As titulary of a right 
in a context of consensual divorce, a divorcing woman is to be regarded 
otherwise than as a passive victim of adultery. Alimony could henceforth 
be bargained away with the advice of counsel — say, in exchange for 
concessions regarding the division of matrimonial property — as opposed 
to ceded by sexual misconduct judged by the publicly fixed terms of the 
marriage (or sexual) contract.34 While critiques of liberal rights discourse 
abound, there is something to be said for Justice Wilson’s understanding of 
maintenance as a right that might be ceded at the negotiating table, not in 
the bedroom. A heading in Justice Wilson’s exposition of possible 
approaches to the key question further reveals her model. She glossed a line 
of judgments by the Ontario Court of Appeal, with which she sympathized, 
as exemplifying a “‘private choice’ approach”.35 “Private choice” might 
                                                                                                             
29 Christine Davies, “Judicial Interpretation of the Support Provisions of the Divorce Act, 
1985” (1992) 8 C.F.L.Q. 265, at 265. 
30 William Pinder Eversley, The Law of the Domestic Relations, 3d ed. (London: Stevens 
and Haynes, 1906), at 167. 
31 Adriana Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, Paul A. Kottman, 
trans. (London: Routledge, 2000), at 50. 
32 Pelech, supra, note 1, at 829 [sic], 828. 
33 Richardson, supra, note 1, at 870. 
34 Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), chapter 6. 
35 Pelech, supra, note 1, at 833. 
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fairly be understood as contrasting with public constraint, such as that of a 
moral economy in which women’s infidelity ensured their privation.36 
Scholars were right that Justice Wilson underestimated the 
constraints on women’s contractual disposition of their right to spousal 
support. Readers of the trilogy are also justifiably critical of its 
impoverished working out of causation, including the failure to 
appreciate the effects of a specialization in domestic labour during a 
marriage on an effort, after divorce, to integrate into the labour market. 
The judgments’ difficulties seem to be ones more at the level of applying 
principles to facts than of devising the principles themselves. The 
statement, in Pelech, that courts were required “to analyze the pattern of 
financial interdependence generated by each particular relationship and 
devise a support order that minimizes as far as possible the economic 
consequences of the relationship’s breakdown”37 is not itself especially 
objectionable. The factual assessment of the causal relation — that is, 
absence of one — between the relationship breakdown and the 
claimant’s financial straits is especially problematic in Richardson.38 
One can also wonder if Justice Wilson reflected adequately on the 
message that lawyers and judges would infer from a trilogy of judgments 
in which, in each case, the claimant failed to satisfy the threshold for 
judicial alteration of the support duties. Family law scholars sometimes 
criticize the Court for what they regard as inconsistent applications of 
principles to similar facts.39 Here, by contrast, the ostensible “clarity” 
                                                                                                             
36 The French translation of “the ‘private choice’ approach” as “la thèse de ‘l’autonomie de 
la volonté’” (id., at 833) lacks this flavour, instead evoking — in a way foreign to Wilson J.’s 
original text — the classical will theory of contracts. Jean-Louis Baudouin, Les obligations, 6th ed. 
by Pierre-Gabriel Jobin with Nathalie Vézina (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2005), at paras. 72-91. 
37 Pelech, supra, note 1, at 829. 
38 It is solely in Richardson that La Forest J., who wrote separate reasons in all three 
judgments of the trilogy, dissented. Several features of the case ground the intuition that the most 
unfair of the three outcomes was the denial of support to Mrs. Richardson. First, Mrs. Richardson 
advanced the claim for spousal support with her petition for divorce. By contrast, Mrs. Pelech made 
her claim for spousal support 13 years after the divorce, a point by which Mr. Pelech might, a good 
deal more reasonably than Mr. Richardson, have supposed himself free of any contingent liability 
from the dissolved marriage. Second, the final, typewritten version of the Minutes of Settlement 
accepted as the basis for denying Mrs. Richardson’s claim for support differed, crucially, from the 
earlier, handwritten version: unlike the typewritten version, the earlier version contained no clause 
declaring the settlement to be final and conclusive. Third, Mrs. Richardson’s difficulty in integrating 
into the labour market really does seem to have been caused by her having been a homemaker 
during the marriage (Richardson, supra, note 1, at 864, 863). 
39 Young v. Young, [1993] S.C.J. No. 112, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), and P. (D.) v. S. (C.), 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 111, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.), are two judgments which, if distinguishable, 
are perhaps an example of the phenomenon. 
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when the Court resolved three disputes the same way imposed its own 
costs: it made a “test” look like a rule. 
In any event, the understanding, expounded in Moge,40 of the 
equitable compensation due to some former spouses on dissolution of a 
marriage depended on an economic lexicon largely absent from spousal 
support jurisprudence not long before the trilogy. Admittedly, the text of 
the 1986 Act gestures towards a compensatory vocation for spousal 
support.41 Yet more than is generally recognized, Pelech laid the 
groundwork for the current understandings of that obligation. While 
Pelech did not go far enough in recognizing women’s economic 
contributions to marriage and their opportunity costs, it opened 
conceptual space for such recognition. In this respect, Pelech may be 
viewed as background to Moge more positively. Today’s standard 
readings of the judgment, which look back critically from Moge to 
Pelech, seem to impede appreciation of Pelech’s moving forward from 
the past. 
III. PRIVATIZATION AND THE STATE 
A recurring charge is that the Pelech trilogy privatized the family. In 
one of the best-known phrases, Justice Wilson held:  
Where parties, instead of resorting to litigation, have acted in a mature 
and responsible fashion to settle their financial affairs in a final way 
and their settlement is not vulnerable to attack on any other basis, it 
should not, in my view, be undermined by courts concluding with the 
benefit of hindsight that they should have done it differently.42  
One of the most-cited critiques declares the Pelech judgments 
consistent with the “global trend toward privatization, our traditional 
protection of the private sphere of the family from state intervention 
[and] the current push for settlement of family law cases”.43 The 
judgments sent a strong message against public regulation of the content 
of domestic contracts.44 The Pelech trilogy’s high threshold for variation 
                                                                                                             
40 Supra, note 18. 
41 R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 3, s. 15.2(5)(a). 
42 Pelech, [1987] S.C.J. No. 31, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801, at 853 (S.C.C.). 
43 Martha J. Bailey, “Pelech, Caron, Richardson” (1989-90) 3 C.J.W.L. 615, at 616 
[hereinafter “‘Pelech, Caron, Richardson’”]. 
44 David G. Duff, “The Supreme Court and the New Family Law: Working through the 
Pelech Trilogy” (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 542, at 567. 
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of separation agreements has been thought to reflect a conviction that the 
family is part of the private sphere, beyond the state’s legitimate reach.45 
The implication is unmistakable: if private settlement is “mature and 
responsible”, is not resort to litigation immature and irresponsible?46 
Admittedly, a privatization gesture, such as this one, does not entail a net 
reduction in the amount of law, or at least not in the amount of 
governance.47 Incentives for private settlement are rightly understood as 
themselves technologies of disciplinary governance. Still, the courts’ 
withdrawal is detectable in their apparent disinterest in the contours of 
the post-divorce maintenance obligations. 
If the majority reasons are accurately read as endorsing the 
settlement of family disputes, underscoring the trilogy’s privatizing 
effect risks obscuring a key public dimension. Admittedly, the opening 
paragraph in Pelech implies that a maintenance dispute is a private, 
family affair. Justice Wilson framed the question in comparatively 
narrow terms, focusing on the former spouses and their agreement: 
“Should the parties be held to the terms of their contract or should the 
court intervene to remedy the inequities now alleged by one of the 
parties to be flowing from the bargain previously entered into freely and 
on full knowledge and with the advice of counsel?”48 As the judgment 
proceeds, however, it inscribes the couple and the dispute over support 
in a wider political economy. That is, Justice Wilson demonstrated 
awareness of a picture bigger than just the “private” dispute between 
spouses, and she presumed the state to have obligations to support 
former spouses. 
Justice Wilson announced a high threshold for a court’s intervention 
to order support contrary to a prior agreement. Where that threshold is 
not met, “the obligation to support the former spouse should be, as in the 
case of any other citizen, the communal responsibility of the state”.49 The 
                                                                                                             
45 Barbara C. Bedont, “Gender Differences in Negotiations and the Doctrine of 
Unconscionability in Domestic Contracts” (1994-95) 12 C.F.L.Q. 21, at 26-27. Such criticisms are 
consonant with those raised by Katherine O’Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985). 
46 The lexicon of responsibility presaged later developments elsewhere. On responsibility 
in the post-liberal regulation of divorce in the United Kingdom, see Helen Reece, Divorcing 
Responsibly (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). 
47 See, e.g., Kevin Walby, “Contributions to a Post-Sovereigntist Understanding of Law: 
Foucault, Law as Governance, and Legal Pluralism” (2007) 16 Soc. & Legal Stud. 551. 
48 Pelech, supra, note 42, at 806. 
49 Id., at 852. See similarly Richardson, [1987] S.C.J. No. 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857, at 868 
(S.C.C.). 
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linking of citizens with the state’s communal responsibility echoes T.H. 
Marshall’s sense of citizenship-as-rights.50 Emphasis on the state’s duty 
to support dependent former spouses appears stronger still when — 
bracketing the idea that Pelech begins the spousal support story — one 
connects it to an earlier judgment. 
Four years before Pelech, in Messier v. Delage,51 the majority of the 
Court had held that the former husband’s duty to support his wife should 
persist. Three judges, however, had dissented, Justice Wilson among 
them. Their opening situated the dispute in the grim economy of the 
early 1980s. The appeal raised an important question 
in view of the current economic situation, the difficulty in finding work 
and the resulting high rate of unemployment. Should a divorced spouse 
who is working always bear the consequences of all this and provide 
for the needs of his unemployed former spouse, or is it for the 
government, if it cannot remedy, at least to alleviate the effects, and to 
what extent?52 
The dissent’s answer was that an unemployed divorced spouse 
reflected a social problem, one incurring “the responsibility of the 
government rather than the former husband”.53 Scholars are aware of the 
connections between the Messier dissent and Pelech.54 But emphasis on 
the sequence from Pelech to Moge and on the privatizing effect of 
Pelech overshadows the extent to which it and the dissent in Messier 
endorsed a publicization of the support obligation for former spouses. 
With hindsight, an observation made one year before Pelech is nearly 
comical: feminist scholars attuned to the interpenetration of family law 
and social welfare policy approved the Messier dissent for proposing the 
identical treatment of unemployed former spouses and other individuals. 
They observed, with disappointment, that the proposition appeared 
largely ignored, perhaps because it would entail greater eligibility by 
women to claim income assistance.55 
                                                                                                             
50 T.H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class” in his Citizenship and Social Class and 
Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), at 1. 
51 [1983] S.C.J. No. 80, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 401 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Messier”]. 
52 Id., at 417, Lamer J., dissenting. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, “Domestic Contracts in Ontario and the Supreme Court Trilogy: 
‘A Deal Is a Deal’” (1988) 13 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 31, note 66. 
55 Mary Jane Mossman & Morag MacLean, “Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward a 
New Equality” (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 79, at 103 [footnote omitted]. 
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Admittedly, the emphasis in Pelech on the possible extinguishment 
of private maintenance obligations irrespective of the ensuing need for 
state support is problematic. While the support sought in that judgment 
would have flowed from the Divorce Act,56 reduction of the public 
charge figured among the concerns of provincial legislation regulating 
the duty of support during marriages. For example, Ontario’s regime 
listed reliance on public support as a factor favouring the setting aside of 
a domestic agreement limiting alimony.57 Moreover, Pelech arguably 
failed to address the problem of shifting a gendered pattern of 
dependence outwards from the family, making those who had been 
dependent within the family become, in turn, dependent in “the other 
realms of market and state”.58 Yet desirable or not, Justice Wilson’s 
stance regarding community obligations undermines characterizations of 
Pelech as primarily about privatization. If Pelech privatized the family, it 
simultaneously committed the state to step into the breach. Yet once the 
notion that Pelech chiefly concerned privatization took root, it became 
difficult to see its public aspects. 
Further evidence of the tendency to occlude the trilogy’s public 
dimensions lies in critical characterizations of Justice Wilson’s vision of 
contract, individuals and the family as libertarian.59 Her stance differs 
sharply from libertarianism. The understanding in the trilogy of the 
Divorce Act60 and of the private obligations it authorizes is embedded in 
the state welfare system. Reliance on a social safety net ready to catch 
those disadvantaged by their contracts is incompatible with libertarian 
views of the taxation system as one of “forced labor”61 and of the right to 
welfare as “a right to involuntary servitude from other persons”.62 
Readings of Justice Wilson as libertarian underscore the elision of the 
trilogy’s public elements. While scholarly glosses may help in under-
                                                                                                             
56 R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8. 
57 Richardson, supra, note 49, at 885, La Forest J., dissenting. The point matters in part 
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58 Brenda Cossman, “A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality” 
(1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 303, at 330. 
59 “Pelech, Caron, Richardson”, supra, note 43, at 616; Beverley McLachlin, “Spousal 
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131, at 137. 
60 Supra, note 56. 
61 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), at 169. 
62 Tibor R. Machan, Libertarianism Defended (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), at 297. 
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standing judgments, dominant understandings may hinder appreciation 
of their complexity. 
Fresh difficulties with the critical literature on privatization emerge 
from scholarly readings of the next judgment in the story. On many 
views, Moge took steps to right the Canadian law of spousal support. It 
telegraphed that previous spousal support awards had been “unfairly 
parsimonious”.63 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé clarified that the trilogy was 
not properly read as endorsing a general clean-break theory of support 
absent private agreements. Promoting economic self-sufficiency was not 
the Act’s pre-eminent objective. Moge, in lengthy reasons grounded in 
scholarly acknowledgment of the financial privation confronting many 
women after divorce, elaborated a compensatory theory of spousal 
support. From the perspective that Pelech64 had privatized the family by 
signalling indifference to the distribution of resources as between the 
former partners, Moge is the antithesis of any privatizing gesture. It 
repudiates any sense of the family as a private sphere shielded from 
public scrutiny: a state court concerned itself with the obligations owed 
by one former spouse to another. Determining what will amount to an 
equitable sharing of the economic consequences of a marriage’s end 
requires the judge to enter the supposedly private sphere of the family to 
ensure that justice is done, measured by publicly established, substantive 
norms. If, as a consequence of her unfortunate contract, Mrs. Richardson 
would never receive just compensation for the losses entailed by her 
marriage, Mrs. Moge would get hers. 
Paradoxically, if the low spousal support resulting from the trilogy 
represented a defeat for women that showed the state privatizing the 
family, some commentators feared the same phenomenon in the 
ostensible victory of the substantially thicker, private support obligations 
in Moge. Susan Boyd conjectured that Moge might let society “off the 
hook” in tackling the entrenchment of women’s roles, responsibilities 
and economic dependence.65 Similarly, Colleen Sheppard noted that the 
judgment’s emphasis on privatized economic responsibility for family 
members might minimize a collective commitment to the economic 
well-being of all individuals, irrespective of the presence and economic 
                                                                                                             
63 Carol Rogerson, “Spousal Support after Moge” (1996) 14 C.F.L.Q. 281, at 283; Moge, 
[1992] S.C.J. No. 107, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 (S.C.C.). 
64 Supra, note 42. 
65 Susan B. Boyd, “(Re)Placing the State: Family, Law and Oppression” (1994) 9:1 
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status of a husband or father.66 While Moge appropriately reaffirmed the 
importance of family solidarity — the classical justification for the civil 
law’s enforcement of family support obligations — it remained crucial 
not to lose sight of the collective responsibility triggered by the social 
consequences of divorce.67 Mary Jane Mossman has expressed a similar 
concern that intense focus on enforcement of support obligations owed 
by “deadbeat dads” reinforces the private responsibility for children, 
“masking the state’s abdication of responsibility for children”.68 
The common thread in these writings is that private is bad and public 
is good (or the lesser evil). It would have been better, the critics argue, 
for the process in Pelech69 to have been more public and the husband’s 
private support duty, consequently, to have been larger. Furthermore, it 
is feared that enlarged support duties, such as those found attaching to 
Mr. Moge, might justify the state’s withdrawal from its public 
responsibilities to provide economic support. Admittedly, the measures 
criticized as instruments of privatization are distinguishable; both may 
connect, differently, to women’s inequality. The privatization in Pelech 
concerns the process of dispute resolution and the extent to which a 
private agreement precludes later judicial orders. The privatization 
detected in Moge70 concerns the substance of economic responsibility 
and whether it lies on the state or on individual family members. The 
difficulty for critical intervention is that, possible as it is to distinguish 
privatization by process and by substance, the anti-privatization remedy 
that scholars would have liked to see in Pelech — a public process 
leading to enlargement of the husband’s private support duty — is 
precisely that which causes alarm as the catalyst of privatization in 
Moge. 
In any event, it would be unwise to exaggerate the influence of 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s reasons in Moge on the retrenching welfare 
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state. The “restructuring”71 of the welfare state did not draw its chief 
energy from the Supreme Court Reports. Beginning in the 1970s and 
escalating through the 1990s, various incarnations of neo-liberalism 
provided the impetus for a transformation of the welfare state from one 
relatively universalist and rights-based to one residualist and needs-
based. In a “tectonic shift” criticized by feminist scholars, the costs of 
social reproduction were transferred from state to family.72 
These material and discursive shifts found reflection in family 
decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada. A trio of judgments — 
Bracklow,73 Chartier v. Chartier,74 and M. v. H.75 — reflected “an 
expanding notion of familial responsibility, sweeping more and more 
individuals within the reach of legal support obligations”.76 In Bracklow, 
the Court enlarged the possible bases for an award of spousal support to 
include one that was non-compensatory. As that case turned on 
entitlement to support absent a private agreement, Pelech was not 
directly on point. Still, as the relative priority of spousal and state 
support obligations proved crucial on the facts in Bracklow, it was 
surprising that the reasons made no mention of Justice Wilson’s 
endorsement in Pelech, a dozen years prior, of the state’s duty to support 
its citizens. Instead, Justice McLachlin spoke indignantly of the 
“potential injustice of foisting a helpless former partner onto the public 
assistance rolls”.77 Similarly, in M. v. H., Justice Iacobucci held that the 
challenged legislation had the “deleterious effect” of potentially driving 
a needy member of a same-sex couple to the welfare system, thereby 
imposing additional costs on the “general taxpaying public”.78 If the 
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Court was not a “driving force” in the movement, by the late 1990s it 
had absorbed the intensified emphasis on fiscal conservatism and private 
familial responsibility.79 
In light of these developments, Justice Wilson’s insistence that the 
state care for all individuals, irrespective of their ability to connect 
present need to the means of a former spouse, may appear more 
attractive today. Her judgment implied “hostility to the notion that the 
state might not be fully responsible for its citizens, and to the notion that 
the state should be able to pin its costs for the basic sustenance of a 
citizen on a legal stranger (the former spouse)”.80 Justice Wilson rejected 
in advance the later determination by legislatures, the social assistance 
bureaucracy and the judiciary that it was “too expensive” for society to 
absorb “the cost of public policies assuring spousal equality and 
accessible divorce”.81 Empirically, adequate public support is not 
forthcoming. Yet is the progressive position on spousal support to fortify 
women’s private law claims against men on the basis of formalized 
conjugal relationships? Spousal support is payable only in relatively few 
cases, and those with relatively prosperous men.82 Writing in the mid-
1990s, Professor Mossman — a stern critic of Pelech83 — called for 
“(re)conceptualizing family law reform as a matter of public policy 
rather than the enforcement of private familial obligations”.84 Do not 
Justice Wilson’s statements in Pelech regarding the collective 
responsibility to support dependent former spouses, as any other 
individual, plausibly advance such a rethinking? The ambivalence of 
progressive positions on spousal support — pinioned between the 
imperative of adequately compensating women for their unpaid labours 
and the desire not to construct women as subjects supplicating their 
former male partners for money — underscores this paper’s title: What 
is left of Pelech? If both negative and positive views towards spousal 
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support function as instruments of privatization by the state, what would 
make the family appropriately more public? The views may reflect, 
respectively, long-term and short-term feminist legal strategies. 
Nevertheless, the senses of what is a gesture of privatization and what is 
a progressive stance appear contingent, destabilizing the formulation of 
progressive strategies. 
Normative debates regarding the appropriate place of the state in 
relation to the costs of social reproduction and the resolution of family 
disputes persist. For present purposes, it suffices to observe that the 
privatization of which critics accused Justice Wilson for Pelech85 is a 
different phenomenon — arguably a more anodyne one — than that of 
which critics would accuse her colleagues just over a decade later. 
Viewed across the ensuing two decades, Justice Wilson’s firm 
acceptance of the public charge, as opposed to maximizing the 
redistribution of family resources, is remarkable. It is not that it was 
mistaken for critics at the time to underscore the trilogy’s privatizing 
effect. Rather, the subsequent downloading of the costs of social 
reproduction has altered the background conditions for rereading Pelech. 
The changing contours of criticisms, expressed in terms of privatization, 
levied against spousal support judgments illustrate that the instability of 
political, economic and discursive structures ensures the fragility of 
scholarly interventions. External events may conspire so as to make 
scholarly contentions that appear progressive or progressively feminist at 
one juncture seem less so subsequently. Yet while it is common to 
characterize Pelech as “a product of its era”,86 it is less so to see the 
scholarship discussing it as similarly situated historically. Alterations in 
the present significance of the criticisms of the trilogy relating to 
privatization testify to the contingency of scholarly discourse, as do 
changes relating to a concern about the view of the family that also 
emerged from Pelech. 
IV. FAMILY TIES AND THE PLACE OF INTENTION 
In Pelech Justice Wilson accepted that divorce ends the marriage 
and the spouses are, once more, individuals: “the courts must recognize 
the right of the individual to end a relationship as well as to begin one.” 
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She also wrote, perhaps insensitive to the relation of explicit and implicit 
expressions of intention, that “parties who have declared their 
relationship at an end should be taken at their word.”87 In the years 
following the trilogy, some scholars contended that Justice Wilson 
demonstrated an inappropriately individualist notion of family, one 
connected to her reliance on contractual ordering. For Professor 
Mossman, Justice Wilson’s “idea of family is irrelevant because the 
focus is the individual family members; indeed, even their relationships 
are less significant than their autonomy and independence”.88 The 
judge’s emphasis on contract — the paradigmatically liberal means for 
the creation and extinguishment of relationships and obligations — is 
viewed especially dimly.89 It has been said that the trilogy’s “atomistic 
view” of the family reproduces dominant liberal discourse, which 
misrepresents the “oppressive relationship between husband and wife as 
a freely chosen contract between rational, unencumbered, autonomous 
individuals”.90 
Discussion of the trilogy in this register evokes a rich feminist 
political philosophical literature critical of liberal conceptions of the 
subject as a “self-possessing individual linked to others only by 
agreement”.91 Theorists who take a “relational approach”92 contrast the 
liberal idea of obligation, which is voluntarily undertaken, with their 
notion of relational responsibility, which may be involuntary. They 
perceive interdependent relationships as generating, over time, 
obligations in excess of those devised by contractual undertakings. 
Relational theorists tend to object to a privileging of contract in the 
family setting on the basis that the normative content of deep 
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relationships is unpredictable ex ante.93 Individualism is for many critics 
“the evil demon of modern Western social and political life”.94 
Family law scholarship after Pelech95 complicates the charge that 
Justice Wilson focused — at the expense of a view of families — on 
individuals’ autonomy and independence. The 1990s witnessed 
scholarship critical of the extent to which legal regimes treated the 
family unit as surviving divorce. Specifically, for some critics, the 
operation of child custody and support law has overemphasized the 
family unit at the expense of women’s autonomy. In Thibaudeau v. 
Canada,96 the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a Charter challenge to 
the rule by which child support was taxed in the hands of recipient 
custodial parents (mothers) and deductible by the non-custodial parent 
payors (fathers). Justices Cory and Iacobucci held that the legislation 
conferred a benefit on the “post-divorce ‘family unit’”; for them it was 
“clear” that divorced parents provided financial and emotional support to 
their children “as a unit”.97 For some observers, the Court here evoked 
the familial ideology, historically oppressive to women’s autonomy, 
which assumes that women’s and children’s economic well-being is best 
“secured privately”, through the resources of a husband or father.98 
Application of legislation in connection with custody and access is 
thought to have perpetuated and even created situations “whereby 
women/mothers and their children remain bound to their former male 
partners”.99 Discourses of the “restructured nuclear family” or the “post-
divorce family unit” arguably reinscribe familial ideology and a 
heterosexual norm. Emphasis on access, and indeed on maximum 
contact, by non-custodial parents translates to contact with fathers and 
imposes a corresponding onus on mothers, whose duty it is to facilitate 
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exercise of that access.100 Subsequent to Pelech,101 in light of these 
manifestations of the post-divorce family’s potentially oppressive effects 
on women, Justice Wilson’s recognition of the right of individuals to 
unfasten family ties appears less inimical. 
Further issues arise when moving from opposite-sex families to the 
challenges confronting “dissident mothers”:102 women aiming to raise 
children within a non-traditional family form. Controversy often ensues 
when a woman deploys legal means to assert a “monoparentalité 
choisie”.103 In Trociuk, the Supreme Court of Canada had to determine 
whether vital statistics legislation that permitted a birth mother to 
preclude registration of the biological father (to “unacknowledge” him) 
violated the Charter.104 The Court concluded, unanimously, that the 
impugned provisions discriminated against fathers on the basis of sex. 
Scholars have criticized the Court for ignoring the perspective of women 
wishing “to extract themselves from a relationship with a man”.105 
Another scenario concerned once more the logistics of intentional solo 
motherhood. A woman, who was cohabiting with a man, became 
pregnant via artificial insemination with anonymous donor sperm. 
Neither of them intended for the woman’s partner to become or to act as 
a father. They sought to preclude, by private agreement, the man’s 
subsequent recognition as a de facto parent. The courts, however, 
refused to regard themselves as bound by the formal expression of the 
woman’s and the man’s mutual intention. They reserved the power to 
characterize in the future the factual relationship that would unfold 
between the man and the child.106 The judgment strikes some observers 
as regrettably impinging on the autonomy of a woman to form the family 
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unit of her choosing. Scholars critical of one or both of these judgments 
— committed to “female autonomy” and women’s interest in making 
“autonomous decisions about their family units” even where a known 
father asserts a claim107 — might find a helpful resource in the place 
accorded by Justice Wilson to explicit intention in the formation and 
termination of family relationships. 
When one casts an eye on family law, the openness to the intentional 
management of family bonds by contract acquires special salience. For 
those for whom “traditional” family models are unsatisfactory and 
confining — subjects historically excluded from the “heterosexualized 
familial domain”108 — the development of alternatives may depend on 
robust recognition of private ordering. In many jurisdictions, same-sex 
couples remain excluded from legislated family regimes. They may 
conclude that contract is the best alternative means of establishing 
mutual rights and responsibilities. Carl Stychin argues that contract 
“may provide an alternative language that is productive and enabling” 
for those who may be “stifled” by the dominance of a status approach 
rooted in marriage.109 Turning from adult conjugal relationships to 
parental bonds, surrogate motherhood contracts come to mind, as do 
agreements delineating the relationships between a prospective mother, 
her lesbian partner and a sperm donor. Contract may liberate parties 
from the constraints of a default regime structured around the biological 
parenthood of “natural” mothers and fathers. 
In such cases, a place for contract presumes the legitimacy of 
explicit formal ordering on acutely emotional turf. The possibility for 
lesbians to raise children autonomously from the biological fathers 
depends on the openness to weighting interests of autonomy and 
independence more heavily than the persistence of “the eternal 
biological family”.110 The desire for measures to “enhance the autonomy 
of women who wish to take control over the conditions under which they 
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parent”111 posits individualism in the selection, development and 
sustainment of family relationships. 
A final example links Part III’s elucidation of the shifting 
configurations of private versus public with this part’s exploration of 
intention and choice in family formation. It concerns the scholarly 
reception of recent reforms in Quebec. In 2002, as part of a package of 
reforms introducing a civil union for same-sex couples, the Quebec 
legislature installed a regime that innovated by permitting a woman 
alone or a same-sex couple to become parents of a child by assisted 
procreation.112 Filiation, the institution connecting parents and children, 
is regarded within the civil law of the family as a matter of public order. 
It is with this characterization in mind that scholars in Quebec have 
criticized the potential roles for contract and volition regarding the 
filiation of children born of assisted procreation.113 More specifically, 
according to some critics, the new rules privatize filiation. The parentage 
of the child, no longer the non-negotiable consequence of publicly 
established rules applied syllogistically, becomes a consequence of the 
intention of the persons involved. As a consequence of the intention of 
one or more adults, a child might end up with bonds of filiation 
connecting him to the birth mother alone, to the birth mother and to her 
partner of either sex, or to the birth mother and to the genetic donor.114 
One reading of these criticisms would view the conservative scholars as 
co-opting a feminist discourse to denounce progressive changes to 
filiation as a privatization. The better reading, though, would take the 
denunciations as indicating the multiple rhetorical and substantive 
positions that the idea of privatization can occupy. Where law resolutely 
codes the traditional family — its members’ civil status and their core 
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reciprocal obligations — as public, the flourishing of newer family 
forms may require enlarging the private.115 
In at least some situations, Justice Wilson’s individualism, and her 
attention to the autonomy and independence of individual members of a 
broken family, look better than recognized on Pelech’s publication.116 It 
is fair to ask whether the use of contracts to limit a support duty on the 
end of a family relationship, as in Pelech, is comparable to the use of 
contract to create a new family structure. It is possible to distinguish 
agreements terminating support on a marriage’s end from ones regarding 
the parentage of children. Scrutiny shows, however, that the two 
scenarios are not diametrically opposed. Admittedly, the extent of sunk 
costs and reliance or restitution interests are likely lesser in the case of 
conferring fresh legal status on family relationships than terminating 
existing ties. Yet an agreement that, from one perspective, creates a new 
family arrangement — for instance, two lesbians who, in order to parent 
their child autonomously, secure a sperm donor’s waiver of parental 
status — simultaneously, from another, terminates a different family 
relationship (that between genetic father and child), including its 
potential support duties. Moreover, while the intentionality emphasized 
in some accounts of autonomous lesbian parenting is grounded in 
relations of caregiving,117 intention is nonetheless understood as 
facilitating, ex ante, caregiving by some individuals, such as the social 
mother, and forestalling caregiving and the development of social 
relations by others, such as the sperm donor. Thus while there may be 
contextual differences, demarcating contracts that end family relationships 
from those establishing them may be problematic. 
In any case, criticisms of Pelech118 spoke in general terms when 
questioning Justice Wilson’s view of the family. It has been 
acknowledged that the public/private divide is “indeterminate and 
shifting”, an “ideological marker” that moves vis-à-vis the role of the 
state at “particular historical moments, in particular contexts, and in 
relation to particular issues”.119 The larger point, though, is not just that 
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the boundary shifts, but that the side of it regarded as good varies. It is 
wrong to assume that emphasizing the public is always progressive and 
that the private is always the sphere of oppression. The public/private 
line has varying, contingent effects for those espousing radical, 
homosexual or constructivist views of family, ones in which choice and 
autonomy predominate.120 Admittedly, the extent to which the concept of 
“choice” has the “potential to empower or to disempower women” 
remains fiercely contentious.121 But its prevalence in family discourse 
that presents itself as progressive is nonetheless unmistakable. If 
scholars sometimes overlook private law as a promising source for 
family law developments,122 they may also, with inopportune bluntness, 
reject privacy while aspiring to an egalitarian and progressive family 
justice. Endorsement of public norms and a rejection of consensual 
deviation from them may aid those whose families most reflect dominant 
forms and ideology. They do less, however, for others whose family 
configurations, or the religious norms they abide by, are more 
marginal.123 One need not be the standard bearer for private ordering in 
the family setting to admit that, more than sometimes acknowledged, its 
potential and perils are complex. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Scholars are unlikely to open the dusty volumes of the Supreme 
Court Reports to embrace the Pelech trilogy penned by Justice Bertha 
Wilson. Still, those judgments arguably warrant reactions less harsh — 
or at least more ambivalent — than is common. The orthodox view of 
Pelech124 hides other features of the judgment, such as its effort to 
solidify the view of maintenance as a right, not a form of moral 
governance, and its emphasis on the state’s role in supporting former 
spouses. What is most arresting about Pelech today is not its place for 
private ordering, but its emphasis on robust communal duties. And its 
emphasis on private ordering, denounced by many as an instrument of 
injustice, may today appear fruitful for those seeking to fashion 
unconventional family arrangements of their own. More than evident at 
first blush, determining what is left of Pelech is a complicated exercise. 
By telling the story of the uneven life of a single trilogy of judgments, 
this paper hints, on a larger level, at the uncertainties of legal judgment, 
the variability of the conditions in which texts are read and interpreted, 
and the complexity and unpredictability of the life of ideas. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that the scholarship critical of the 
trilogy has aged badly. The terrain has, however, shifted enough that it is 
necessary to revise assumptions about what advances privatization and the 
objectionableness of independence and autonomy in defining family ties. 
While it is widely accepted in other areas of private law that legal 
scholarship reflects its time and is a worthy object of study as such, the 
temporal existence of Canadian family law scholarship, and the con-
tingency of its assumptions about the family, the state and the market, is 
rather less acknowledged.125 Academics recognize the historical specificity 
of the trilogy itself more than they do that of the scholarship around it. 
While legal scholarship on the family does not constitute a source of law, 
it nevertheless exercises a de facto suasion. It is thus worth trying to 
understand better how family law scholarship operates, including its shelf 
life. Such an understanding may well signal the need for humility on the 
part of scholars regarding the durability of their work. 
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The scholarly reception of Pelech126 and Moge127 and subsequent 
feminist family law scholarship risk appearing contradictory. The 
validation of contracts confirming stingy spousal support is denounced 
as privatization, while, later, more generous support is questioned in the 
same terms. In one instance, contractual termination of family ties is 
criticized as atomistic; elsewhere, it is desired in the service of 
autonomy. Certainly the set of family law scholars working in the field 
— even from an explicitly feminist perspective — is large enough that 
diversity, inconsistency and disagreement are to be expected. Yet it is 
possible to read the tensions and potential contradictions in the 
scholarship another way. The dissatisfaction with family law judgments 
such as Pelech and Moge may indicate not only the fragility of scholarly 
interventions in time, but also the limits of private law adjudication. The 
anticipated dark consequences of narrow and broad understandings of 
spousal support might gesture less towards contradiction than towards 
the structural constraints on individual family law judgments to palliate 
power imbalances and remedy entrenched inequities. Family law 
scholars are, of course, alert to law’s “contradictions, limits, and 
possibilities”, including the limits of law reform.128 It is less common, 
though, to see evidence of these constraints, as this paper does, in 
scholarly contradictions. Perhaps the Pelech trilogy, and the rich subset 
of scholarship it inspired, are best understood as a reminder of the limits 
on the powers of judges and lawyers to remake the world, limits of 
which Justice Bertha Wilson, in her pragmatic wisdom, was soberly 
aware. 
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